The following is an adapted version of an article written by the Minister for Regional Development and Public Administration and a researcher at the Europe Strategy Research Institute Tibor Navracsics, originally published in Hungarian on the Five Minutes Europe blog of Ludovika.hu.
Although some segments of European public opinion have reacted with genuine or feigned outrage to certain aspects of the Hungarian government’s Europe policy, it is worth noting that competing national interests have always been a determining factor in European integration. These considerations have been invoked over the past 70 years by those who envisioned integration primarily as cooperation between member states. At the same time, for those who set their sights on a federal Europe, national interests appeared as obstacles to be overcome, standing in the way of progress and preventing its triumph.
60 years ago, in January 1966, the Luxembourg compromise resolved the first major crisis of European integration, the so-called Empty Chair Crisis. The conflict, which was triggered by the French, was not only epoch-making because it was the first major crisis after the start of European integration. It was also significant—and perhaps this is why it had such a major impact—because it had many layers of meaning, ranging from controversial issues of policy redistribution to debates on the strategic directions of integration.
The Empty Chair Crisis was preceded by the Treaty of Rome, which stipulated that, from 1 January 1966, decision-making in the European Economic Community would shift from consensus to qualified majority voting. As a result of the political changes in France following the drafting of the Treaty, the Fifth Republic, led by Charles de Gaulle and supportive of intergovernmental cooperation, was highly sceptical of this agenda, in contrast to the Fourth Republic, which had supported a federal Europe. As the deadline approached, his opposition became increasingly apparent.
‘For those who set their sights on a federal Europe, national interests appeared as obstacles to be overcome, standing in the way of progress and preventing its triumph’
This growing opposition to federal transformation was further fuelled in 1965 by the planned reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, which France identified as detrimental to its interests. A real problem for France in asserting its position was that, if the negotiations dragged on until early 1966, the French would be forced to accept a solution disadvantageous to them, as they would be in the minority due to the changes in decision-making that would take effect on 1 January.
To prevent a situation detrimental to France’s national interests, the French president took the unprecedented step of recalling his representatives from Council meetings as of 1 July 1965. From then on, France’s absence was marked by empty seats in the Council for six months. More importantly, however, de Gaulle paralyzed the decision-making process of the European Economic Community, as in a consensus-based decision-making system, an absent member state does not give its support to a proposed decision, meaning that the decision is considered not to have been taken.
The decision-making paralysis lasted for six months. Finally, after lengthy negotiations, the Luxembourg compromise dispelled fears of the complete collapse of European integration. It is noteworthy, however, that it was not the Community institutions that were able to resolve the crisis, causing great frustration to the Commission, which defined itself as the driving force behind integration. The compromise was ultimately forged between France and the five other member states opposed to it—Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, West Germany, and Italy—and they all signed it.
The essence of the agreement was that, although the European Economic Community would formally switch to qualified majority voting on 1 January 1966, as originally planned, consensus decision-making would in fact be retained. The Luxembourg compromise allows a member state to veto a decision if it feels that accepting the proposal would harm its essential national interests. In this case, the proposal cannot be considered accepted.
The Luxembourg compromise remained in force until the end of 1985, when the heads of state and government of the member states agreed to refrain from using the veto in the future. Their decision was formalized in the Single European Act, which introduced qualified majority voting for Community policies.
Although this was the first such case, it was by no means the only one. It clearly shows that even member states cooperating within the framework of integration are willing to do everything in their power to assert what they consider to be their fundamental national interests.
Read more:
Click here to read the original article.
At a time when public debate is increasingly polarized and superficial, Hungarian Conservative remains committed to depth, intellectual honesty, and independent conservative thought.
Producing high-quality journalism requires resources. Your contribution helps us expand our coverage, reach new audiences, and keep our content accessible.
Please consider supporting our mission.
