Welcome to the second edition of As Seen from The Right Bank, a new column for Hungarian Conservative. The column’s name reflects three ideas. First, the Danube Institute, for whom I work, has its seat in the Castle District of Buda—literally on the Right Bank of the great river. Second, right is the political direction to which Hungarian Conservative (obviously) and the Danube Institute tilt. Third, there is the implication that the view from the other side is not necessarily correct.
The aim of the column is simple: to promote great written research in the social sciences and in a way that will save you time. If you like what you see—or even if you don’t—you will find a link to the research paper that is described briefly and in plain English.
Naturally, your views are welcome. This is particularly true if you disagree with the author of the research paper that is being discussed in this column. Both Hungarian Conservative and the Danube Institute look to encourage respectful debate. If you are aware of a research paper that is particularly inspiring, insightful or important, feel free to bring it to my attention. My contact details are shown below.
Making Sense of Europe’s Constitutions
A recently published research paper by Ofir Haivry—an expert on the history of political thought who is the Vice-President of the Herzl Institute of Jerusalem and a co-founder of the Edmund Burke Foundation of Washington, DC—is an excellent example of the reports that will be discussed in this column. His paper fills a research gap and, in doing so, makes European politics much easier to understand.
Ofir does this by looking at the development of constitutions in Europe over the last 800 years or so. He suggests that there are four broad models. One is the National Charter, which defines the rights of the King and subjects. A very famous example is England’s Magna Carta of 1215: as Ofir puts it: ‘more than 800 years after it was first issued, three central provisions of the Magna Carta are still recognized as established laws in England.’ Less well known is the Hungarian Golden Bull of 1222: this compelled King Andrew II to accept several principles, ‘among them that the nobles as well as the church, were guaranteed that they may be regularly taxed only with their consent, and the same principle was applied to the obligation to finance or fight a war outside of Hungary, even going as far as asserting a ‘right to resist’ … the King, if he acted contrary to the law or tried to undo this settlement.’
The second broad model is a union of groups or communities to form a League or Confederation. Unlike in a nation-state, the groups do not fully fuse into one single entity. There were several examples in Europe between the 12th and 15th centuries. However, the most durable, dating from 1291, is the Swiss Confederation. The third model is what Ofir describes as the Administrative Unitary State, of which France’s Napoleonic Code of 1804 is a classic example.
The Administrative Unitary State is often seen as a good way to prevent conflict between people of different customs and/or religions. In Ofir’s words: ‘However, this system is not only very centralized and bureaucratic in character, but it also destroys self-rule even at the most local level and, of course, is the opposite of representative government. Moreover, it is by its very nature opposed to traditions, seeing in them unnecessary impediments to the rationalization and efficiency of its rulings. In today’s political environments, the use of new technologies – from centralized CCTV face recognition to authorization of sweeping data gathering – is being harnessed to justify further expansion of administrative oversight into ever more private areas of life. This is particularly true in countries of the European Union (EU).’
Ofir identifies a fourth model, or what he calls ‘the Anti-Constitution’. In this case, the constitution ‘is created in response to some catastrophe that befell a country and that [is] designed principally to prevent a recurrence of the disaster – rather than to promote a positive national vision.’ Ofir cites Germany and, if to a lesser degree, Spain and Portugal as examples. Crucially, France also provides an example—although the catastrophe happened not in 1945 but in 1789. ‘In a sense, the French Revolution is still going on. In the last 200 years, there have been no fewer than 11 different constitutions in France that have sought to define a new model of governance that successfully reflects the country’s national identity. It is not clear that even the latest version does this.’
Ofir concludes: ‘For a conservative it is important to understand the nature and function of the constitution in his/her country, and to consider how it can be made to work towards fostering national goals, or amended if it is failing to fulfil its role. In cases where the constitution is mainly based on a negative vision of the dangers it should obstruct, a more positive vision could be sought either in piecemeal alterations, or even a wider constitutional overhaul. In some countries, this increasingly looks necessary.’
Dr Ofir Haivry’s Research Paper, Constitutions of Europe: Different Models and What They Teach Us, may be found here:
What the ‘Age of Sovereignty’ Means for Europe
Nation-states in Europe (and indeed, within the EU) do not just differ from each other in terms of their constitutional model. They also differ in terms of foreign policies. Juan Soto, a Visiting Fellow at the Danube Institute who is also a strategic consultant and political theorist, has written a paper that looks at how the transatlantic relationship—between the United States (and Canada) on one hand and European countries on the other—is changing in an era that can be described as an ‘Age of Sovereignty’.
Juan defines an ‘Age of Sovereignty’ as one in which geopolitics ‘moves away from liberal internationalism toward much more transactional and sovereigntist approaches designed to benefit individual nation states rather than alliances’.
So, what could this mean for geopolitics over the next five years? Juan discusses several scenarios. In one, Rebalanced Atlanticism, NATO continues to function as it does today, but with European states lifting their defence spending by a significant amount: the United States’ focus shifts towards the Indo-Pacific. In another scenario, Strategic Hedging, Europe pursues greater diplomatic and economic engagement with China and the Global South but maintains a security relationship with the United States. Alternatively, a Fragmented Europe involves Europe remaining important economically but failing to function as a unified geopolitical player. Juan also considers European Strategic Consolidation, where the EU operates as an autonomous geopolitical actor.
For observers of—and protagonists in—geopolitics, there are important conclusions. As Juan notes: ‘The paper identifies dilemmas for leaders in both Europe and the United States. In the former, there are rising expectations for strategic responsibility — but in a continent where foreign relations are handled by individual countries (and not necessarily in concert). In the latter, there is the possibility that a sovereigntist and transactional U.S. foreign policy will inadvertently accelerate the emergence of Europe as a distinct geopolitical pole — within a multi-polar system. The clear conclusion is that the impact of the “Age of Sovereignty” is still being defined.’
Juan A Soto’s Research Paper, The Transatlantic Relationship in the ‘Age of Sovereignty’, may be found here:
The Impact of US Politics
Juan Soto’s paper discusses the question: What is the ‘Age of Sovereignty’? Another paper recently published by the Danube Institute does not mention the ‘Age of Sovereignty’ in as many words, but does provide an explanation as to why it exists. The reason is the Make America Great Again (MAGA) movement in the United States and its impact on the Trump administration. Surprising as some of these foreign-policy decisions may be to the governments of countries allied with the United States, the President nonetheless has a genuine mandate to make them.
Sean Nottoli, a Visiting Fellow at the Danube Institute and an expert in conservative politics in the United States, has written a paper that explains how various US allies—in Europe and in the Indo-Pacific—‘are adapting to evolving US expectations and identify the varying and differing pathways through which allies can enhance their strategic relevance.’ The countries that Sean looks at include Estonia, Hungary, Australia and Japan.
Sean concludes that ‘the current alliance system is rapidly undergoing a dynamic shift in which allies are no longer evaluated on their historical status but on their capability to fulfil needed strategic niches in the broader alliance framework. This shift has large implications for the future of burden-sharing, deterrence credibility, and regional stability. While this change creates uncertainty and concerns for America’s allies, it also creates opportunities for both established and emerging partners to redefine their roles within US-led security frameworks.’
Sean Nottoli’s Research Paper, The MAGA Effect: The Impact of US Domestic Policies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, may be found here:
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